




A number of approaches to quantum gravity (QG) seem to imply that spacetime
does not exist. Philosophers are quick to point out, however, that the loss of space-
time should not be regarded as total. Rather, we should interpret these approaches
as ones that threaten the fundamentality but not the existence of spacetime. In
this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I argue that spacetime realism is not
forced by QG; spacetime eliminativism remains an option. Second, I argue that
eliminativism provides a useful framework for developing two existing approaches
to the metaphysics of QG, involving functionalism and mereology respectively.
1. Introduction
Quantum gravity (QG) is the name of a broad program that seeks to reconcile our two
best physical theories at the moment: general relativity (GR) and the standard model
of particle physics. It is well known that these theories are in tension with one another.
While it is possible to provide a quantum account of the various fields that populate the
standard model, it is extraordinarily difficult to quantize the gravitational field in GR. A
central goal of quantum gravity is to produce a quantum account of gravitation, one that
works for the low energy regime currently described by GR as well as the high energy
regime where GR breaks down.
A number of approaches to QG seem to carry a surprising implication: spacetime does
not exist fundamentally.1 This implication has been identified for a range of theories in
different ways, including: string theory, loop quantum gravity, causal set theory, and
canonical quantum gravity. Some philosophers maintain, however, that the apparent loss
of spacetime within physics should not be regarded as total. Spacetime exists, they argue,
just as a non-fundamental entity. If that’s right, then the central task both for physicists
engaged in developing the approaches to QG at issue, and for philosophers interpreting
those approaches, is to provide an account of how spacetime exists as a non-fundamental
or ‘emergent’ entity. That is, it must be shown “how relativistic spacetimes re-emerge ...
from the fundamental structure as postulated by the theory at stake” (Wüthrich 2019,
p. 2).
Call the view according to which spacetime exists: spacetime realism. Spacetime
realism is to be contrasted with spacetime eliminativism.2 The spacetime eliminativist
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1See Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) for an overview.
2See Le Bihan (2018b) for more on realism and eliminativism.
1
2 THREE ARGUMENTS
denies that spacetime exists: spacetime, on this view, does not re-emerge in a meta-
physical sense. Most of the discussion surrounding QG has focused on realism.3 Explicit
arguments against spacetime eliminativism are scarce, but there appear to be three such
arguments available. In this paper I show that eliminativism is at least an option by
addressing all three arguments. Having shown that spacetime eliminativism is an option,
I then argue that it provides a useful framework for developing two existing metaphysical
interpretations of QG: a functionalist interpretation, on the one hand, and a mereological
interpretation, on the other. In both cases, situating these approaches within an elimi-
nativist framework presents a way to address certain concerns that have been raised for
each view.
To be clear, my aim is not to defend eliminativism. The point is just that we cannot
rule eliminativism out: it remains an open possibility, and it constitutes a potentially
fruitful way of thinking about QG. Whether spacetime eliminativism is the correct inter-
pretation of any approach to QG is a matter I leave for another time.
2. Three Arguments
Must we be spacetime realists? In answering this question, I won’t consider any specific
approach to QG to see whether spacetime realism or spacetime eliminativism is most
appropriate for that approach. Rather, I will focus on general considerations concerning
the broad QG program. The idea is to see whether eliminativism is ruled out based
on what we know about QG in general. Because the QG program is still very much a
work in progress, with new theories likely to be developed in the future and old theories
redeveloped, it is useful to consider whether, in a general sense, we should always be
thinking in realist terms.
As noted, there are three arguments that seem to offer a mandate in favour of
spacetime realism. In this section, I will introduce all three arguments, and provide a
response in each case.
2.1. Deducibility
The first argument focuses on the inter-theoretic relationship between any theory within
the broad QG program and GR. GR, it is thought, should be recoverable from the under-
lying physics of QG in a certain sense. As Crowther (2018, p. 75) puts the point:
QG is understood as any theory that satisfies the set of criteria that are taken
to define QG. Currently, there is no well-established, generally agreed-upon
set; however, some of the criteria whose inclusion is the least controversial
across all the approaches to QG concern the relationships to, and between,
current theories. For instance, I take it that the set includes at least the
following criteria: that the theory describe the domains where both GR and
quantum theory are necessary; that the theory “recover” GR in the regimes
where GR is known to be successful; and that the theory take into account
quantum theory.
3Spacetime realists include Chalmers (forthcoming); Le Bihan (2018b); Lam and Wüthrich (2018);
Wüthrich (2017, 2019); Yates (2021).
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Recovery requires (at a minimum) derivability: GR is recoverable from QG only if GR
can be derived from QG using various bridge laws or approximation procedures.4
The requirement for GR to be deducible from a theory of QG can be used to formulate
an argument against spacetime eliminativism as follows. First, assume that deduction
conducts ontological commitment, in this sense: for any two theories T1 and T2, if T2 is
derivable from T1 and, moreover, we have good reason to believe in the existence of the
entities posited by T1, then we should also believe in the existence of the entities posited
by T2. Next, suppose that, for some approach to QG, we should believe in the existence
of the entities posited by that theory. Then it follows that we should also believe in the
entities posited by GR because GR can be derived from QG.
Of course, we don’t yet know whether we should believe in the particular entities
posited by an existing approach to QG, because we don’t know which (if any) of the
approaches to QG is the correct approach. But in a sense, it doesn’t matter. Because,
if Crowther is right, we must be able to derive GR from an underlying theory of QG, we
have no choice but to accept the existence of spacetime, because we know that we will
be forced to accept the ontology of some approach to QG at some point.
This argument against spacetime eliminativism can be summarised as follows:
1. For any theory T1 and any theory T2, if T2 is derivable from T1 then if the entities
posited by T1 exist, so do the entities posited by T2.
2. GR is derivable from QG.
3. For some theory of QG, the entities posited by that theory exist.
4. Therefore, the entities posited by GR exist.
The problem with the argument lies with the first premise. To see the issue, let
us set QG aside for a moment and consider a related example. The example involves
the relationship between GR and a Newtonian theory, specifically Newton-Cartan theory
(NC). NC is a reformulation of the core ideas underlying Newtonian mechanics. The
basic idea is to take Poisson’s field-theoretic formulation of Newton’s law of gravitation
and show that Newtonian gravitation expressed in this way can be captured in terms of
a relationship between geometric curvature and matter distribution. NC is thus a way of
reformulating Newton’s account of gravitation that renders it analogous to GR. Having
generalised Newton’s theory in this manner, it is then possible to show that Newton’s
equations for gravitation constitute a mathematical limit of GR. We can thus derive NC
from GR under certain conditions. In particular, for a group of test particles that are
moving slowly with respect to the speed of light, and that are situated within a weak,
static gravitational field, the GR description reduces to the description provided by the
reformulated Newtonian theory.5
The ontological commitments of GR and NC appear to be distinct. GR is commit-
ted to the existence of a physical structure that can be represented by a differentiable
manifold, M, equipped with a metric tensor field, gab (described by the field equations)
which defines the geometry at each point in the manifold. NC, by contrast, describes a
physical structure that corresponds to a differentiable manifold, M, equipped with two
4See Butterfield and Isham (1999) for discussion.
5See Carrol (2019) for details.
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orthogonal metrics: τ—a temporal metric, which is used to assign temporal coordinates
and distances to vectors on the manifold—and h—a spatial metric, which is used to
assign spatial lengths. The manifold structure 〈M, τ, h〉 is not isomorphic to the manifold
structure of GR, namely 〈M, gab〉. The metric of GR is generally covariant, whereas the
manifold structure of Newton-Cartan theory obeys the symmetries defined by the Galilea
group. Prima facie this mathematical difference between the two theories translates into
an ontological difference. The physical structure described by GR can be interpreted as
a four-dimensional structure in which space and time are woven together. The physical
structure described by NC, by contrast, presents a picture in which space and time are
distinct, orthogonal dimensions.
Because NC is derivable from GR, we can formulate an analogous argument to the one
outlined above in favour of spacetime realism. The argument moves from the assumption
that the entities posited by GR exist to the conclusion that the entities posited by NC
exist and thus toward what might be called Newtonian realism (by way of analogy with
spacetime realism). This argument can be stated as follows:
1. For any theory T1 and any theory T2, if T2 is derivable from T1 then if the entities
posited by T1 exist, so do the entities posited by T2.
2. NC is derivable from GR.
3. The entities posited by GR exist.
4. Therefore, the entities posited by NC exist.
This argument seems much less compelling than the argument against spacetime
eliminativism, however. Assume, for the sake of argument, that we should accept the
existence of the entities posited by GR. Even so, it seems at least permissible to adopt a
form of Newtonian eliminativism, whereby the ontology of NC is eliminated in favour of
the underlying physical structure described by GR. There is no requirement, that I can see,
to believe in the existence of the entities posited by NC. Eliminativism in this case seems
to be at least an option. This is not to say that we are forced to deny the existence of the
Newtonian structures posited by NC either. It may be possible to make a philosophical
case for realism about NC.6 But the case must be made. We are not compelled to believe
in the Newtonian entities posited by NC just because NC is deducible from GR. If that’s
right, however, then deduction is not in general sufficient for ontological commitment.
This undermines the first premise in the argument for Newtonian realism. Since this is
also the first premise in the argument involving GR and QG stated above, that argument
fails as well.
Now, one might concede that the first premise in both arguments is false and thus
that there is no general connection between deduction and ontological commitment, but
maintain that in the specific case of GR and QG deduction is sufficient for ontological
commitment nonetheless. In order to defend this approach one must also hold that
deduction is not sufficient for ontological commitment in the case of GR and NC. This
localised approach to the matter thus requires identifying some difference between the
GR/QG case and the GR/NC case that might support a differential attitude toward
deduction and ontology. Perhaps there is some such difference to be found: it may be
6Wallace (2020) seems to hold this view.
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that the way deduction works in the case of GR and NC is substantially different to
the deduction of GR from QG and perhaps such a difference translates into a difference
in ontological commitment. I certainly cannot exclude this possibility. But no such
difference has been identified yet, and so we are not in a position to rule eliminativism
about spacetime out via deduction alone.
Of course, one might argue that realism about the entities posited by NC is, in fact,
forced, and that I am just wrong in my assessment of the Newtonian case. I will provide
a reply to this broad line of thought in a moment. Before I do so, however, let us turn
to the second argument against spacetime eliminativism, since the relationship between
GR and NC is important for that argument as well.
2.2. Empirical Adequacy
Like the first argument against spacetime eliminativism, the second argument rests on
a theoretical relationship that is expected to hold between QG and GR. Rather than a
relation of deduction, however, the relationship is one of empirical recovery. Empirical
recovery involves showing that the confirmed empirical predictions of one theory, T1, can
be reproduced by another theory, T2. Often, the predictions can only be reproduced by
holding T2 under certain constraints, or by applying it only to certain situations. In the
case of GR and QG it is expected that every confirmed empirical prediction of GR will
be reproduced by a theory of QG. This generally means that the confirmed empirical
predictions of GR ought to be a subset of the empirical predictions of a theory of QG
within the low energy regime where GR is successful.
Empirical recovery is related to deduction, but they are not necessarily the same thing.
A deductive relationship is likely to ensure some measure of empirical recovery between
theories. The deducibility requirement considered above can thus be viewed as one way of
meeting a deeper demand for empirical recovery. Empirical recovery does not, however,
require deduction. A theory can generally reproduce the empirical predictions of another
theory without entailing it. Like deduction, however, one might argue that a relationship
of empirical recovery between two theories has ontological implications. Specifically, when
the confirmed empirical predictions of one theory are recovered by another theory, then
if we accept the existence of whatever is posited by the recovering theory, we are forced
to also accept the existence of whatever is posited by the recovered theory. Using this
general idea we can formulate an argument against spacetime eliminativism based on the
empirical relationship expected to hold between QG and GR:
1. For any theory T1 and any theory T2, if every confirmed empirical prediction of T2
is also an empirical prediction of T1, then if the entities posited by T1 exist, so do
the entities posited by T2.
2. Every confirmed empirical prediction of GR is also an empirical prediction of QG.
3. For some theory of QG, the entities posited by that theory exist.
4. Therefore, the entities posited by GR exist.
A similar relationship of empirical recovery holds between GR and NC. Like GR,
Newton’s account of gravitation is immensely successful within a certain regime (as
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noted: for objects situated in weak, static gravitational fields, that are moving slowly with
respect to the speed of light). Indeed, this is one of the central reasons we continue to use
Newtonian physics for a range of different real-world applications. Now, GR is capable of
reproducing all of the empirical successes of a Newtonian account of gravitation. Within
the relevant regime, every confirmed prediction of Newton’s account of gravitation is
a confirmed prediction of GR as well. Because NC just is a reformulation of Newton’s
account of gravity, it inherits the same class of confirmed empirical predictions, and thus
stands in the same relationship of empirical recovery to GR. We can thus formulate an
analogous argument to the one above, except that this argument is designed to rule out
eliminativism about the entities posited by NC:
1. For any theory T1 and any theory T2, if every confirmed empirical prediction of T2
is also an empirical prediction of T1, then if the entities posited by T1 exist, so do
the entities posited by T2.
2. Every confirmed empirical prediction of NC is also an empirical prediction of GR.
3. The entities posited by GR exist.
4. Therefore, the entities posited by NC exist.
As with the deduction-based argument against Newtonian eliminativism, this recovery-
based argument is not compelling. As already discussed, realism does not seem to be
required in the case of NC. If realism about the entities posited by NC is not forced here,
however, then it follows that empirical recovery is not, in general, sufficient for ontological
commitment. Accordingly, the first premise in the empirical recovery argument appears
false, and thus the related argument against spacetime eliminativism that uses the same
premise fails.
As before, one might respond that spacetime realism is, in fact, required by the
relationship of empirical recovery between GR and QG, even though relationships of this
kind are not generally sufficient for ontological commitment. In order to hold the line
and rule out spacetime eliminativism, some difference must, once again, be identified
between the GR and QG case on the one hand, and the GR and NC case on the other.
For instance, one might argue that the number of empirical predictions that must be
recovered in the case of NC is much smaller than the number to be recovered in the case
of GR. Or, in the same vein, one might argue that the types of empirical predictions to
be recovered in the case of NC are different in kind to those that must be recovered for
GR. At present, however, we lack an account of how many or what types of confirmed
empirical predictions must be recovered for realism. In the absence of a convincing story
along these lines, spacetime eliminativism remains open.
2.3. Perfect and Imperfect Realism
In a moment, I will consider the third and final argument against spacetime eliminativism.
My response to that argument does not rely on an analogy between QG/GR, and GR/NC.
Before proceeding, then, it is worth briefly considering a response to the proposed parallel
between the two cases. I have claimed that we are not forced to adopt a realist attitude
toward the entities posited by NC; eliminativism is at least open in this case. As noted,
6
2 THREE ARGUMENTS
however, one might simply disagree with this assessment: realism is required in the case
of NC after all.
At first glance, this kind of response might not seem all that plausible. NC has, after
all, been fully superseded by GR. Precisely what we learn in the shift from Newtonian
mechanics to relativistic physics one might argue is that we have no need for the broadly
Newtonian structures posited by NC. Indeed, one might go a bit further and argue that
realism is not even an option in the case of NC, let alone a requirement. We should,
rather, be realists about GR, and eliminativists about NC despite the inter-theoretic
relationships that obtain between the two theories.
This assessment of the situation, however, is too quick. To see why, it is important
to draw a distinction between two kinds of realist attitude that one might adopt toward
a given theory: perfect realism and imperfect realism (cf. Chalmers (forthcoming)).
According to perfect realism, the entities posited by a theory T exist exactly as that theory
describes them. Perfect realism requires there to be an exact isomorphism between the
structure of a given theory and the structure of the world. Imperfect realism, by contrast,
eschews perfect matching between a theory and the world, and thus requires at best a
partial isomorphism between theory and world. According to imperfect realism, we can
adopt a realist attitude toward a theory, and thus admit that the entities named by the
theory exist, while denying that those entities are exactly as the theory describes them.
The imperfect realist thus allows that what exists can be approximated by a theory, and
that this approximation is sufficiently close to warrant the claim that what the theory
posits exists.
In the case of GR and NC, perfect Newtonian realism does seem to be false. The
entity posited by GR is not perfectly described by NC. A physical entity corresponding
to the metric structure of GR is, at best, approximately described by NC, and only under
very specific circumstances. If one adopts a form of perfect realism about NC anyway,
then it seems that one is forced to ‘double’ one’s ontology in an unattractive manner,
by accepting the existence of the ontology of GR plus some new entity that is perfectly
described by the Newtonian theory. Not only would positing such a structure bring
no extra benefits from the perspective of physics, positing the structure would incur a
significant theoretical burden. One would need to explain how the extra Newtonian entity
and the relativistic structure of GR relate to one another.
Imperfect Newtonian realism, by contrast, does not face the same difficulties. The
imperfect Newtonian realist does not ‘double’ the ontology. The imperfect Newtonian
realist maintains that there exists some physical structure—whatever structure is needed
for GR—and this physical structure is approximately described by the Newtonian theory.
The approximation is sufficiently close to warrant a realist attitude toward the Newtonian
theory. In this way, the entities posited by NC exist well-enough for realist purposes.
The central reason, then, why we should not be too quick to adopt an eliminativist
attitude toward NC is that imperfect realism about NC might be true. We thus cannot
dismiss the idea that realism about NC might be required on the grounds that perfect
realism is false or otherwise implausible. The strongest form of the objection outlined at
the beginning of this section, then, holds that imperfect realism is forced in the case of
NC. If imperfect realism about NC is required, then the entities posited by NC exist well-
enough and the parallel between the QG/GR case and the GR/NC case fails to undermine
the first premise in each of the two arguments against spacetime eliminativism considered
above. If, by contrast, NC eliminativism remains open even against the imperfect realist
7
2 THREE ARGUMENTS
option, then the parallel between the QG/GR case and the GR/NC case continues to be
probative, in so far as it still shows that spacetime eliminativism cannot be ruled out by
deduction or empirical recovery alone.
The question before us, then, is whether imperfect realism about NC really is required.
Now, as noted, I am willing to concede that imperfect realism about NC is open. But
I maintain that we simply don’t know enough about how imperfect realism works to
warrant the claim that we must be imperfect realists about NC. Imperfect realism relies
crucially on the notion of approximation, and closeness. The imperfect realist maintains
that some x described by a theory T exists well-enough so long as there exists some y
that is approximately described by T and the approximation is sufficiently close.
This last part is particularly important. While imperfect realism allows for a certain
degree of approximation, even imperfect realism must have its limits. When the difference
between what exists and the description provided by a given theory is too great, realism
no-longer seems appropriate. The difficulty is that we currently lack a general account
of how close is close enough for realist purposes when it comes to imperfect realism.
What would such an account look like? Well, imperfect realism relies on a notion of
similarity. Because similarity comes in degrees and can be measured in different respects,
an account of how close is close enough for realism requires two things. First, it requires
the specification of a threshold: a degree of similarity such that only similarity to that
degree or greater implies realism. Second, some account must be given of the dimensions
of similarity that matter when it comes to imperfect realism including, presumably, an
account of any weights applied to those dimensions.
Without an account along these lines—and to my knowledge one is yet to be
provided—it is difficult indeed to make the case that imperfect realism about NC is
required. Moreover, providing an account of imperfect realism along the right lines
seems to be a difficult task. Any such account will need to walk the line between too
much similarity and not enough similarity. For if one specifies the requirements for close-
ness too tightly then imperfect realism will be too hard to establish; if one specifies the
requirements for closeness too loosely, imperfect realism will be too easy. As matters
stand, then, eliminativism about NC cannot be ruled out. If that’s right, however, then
the GR/NC case continues to serve as a counterexample to the first premise in each of
the two arguments against spacetime eliminativism considered above.
Indeed, what the discussion of imperfect realism shows us is that there is a rather
direct response to those arguments available. First, note that QG puts perfect realism
about GR under threat as well. Indeed, it is generally expected that GR will be at best
an approximate description of whatever structure is ultimately posited by QG. In so far
as any inter-theoretic relationship between QG and GR can force a realist attitude toward
the ontology of GR, it can at best force a commitment to imperfect realism. As noted,
however, there is no agreement on how close is close enough for imperfect realism, or on
what the relevant degrees of similarity might be that matter for realism. So we are not in
a position to know whether either deduction or empirical recovery force a realist attitude
of this kind in the case of QG and GR. It really depends on exactly how imperfect realism
works, and on the account one gives of closeness.
The analogy between the QG/GR case and the GR/NC case is not strictly required for
this direct response to work. The direct response relies only on our lack of understanding
concerning imperfect realism. This, one might worry, makes the GR/NC case into an idle
wheel in much of the discussion thus far. While the availability of the direct response does
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tend to diminish the importance of the GR/NC case, that case still has a role to play in
the current dialectic. What the GR/NC case reveals is just how limited our understanding
of imperfect realism really is. We don’t know enough about imperfect realism to be able
to rule out eliminativism via inter-theoretic relations between theories in even fairly well-
understood cases, where we have a deep understanding of the two theories at issue. This
tends to cast doubt on our prospects for being able to rule out eliminativism in much
harder cases, such as the relationship between QG and GR.
The GR/NC case can also be used to fend off a further objection. I have argued
that we don’t know enough about imperfect realism to be able to rule out spacetime
eliminativism. One might worry, however, that the problem doesn’t have much to do
with imperfect realism. The problem, or rather the appearance of a problem, is simply
due to the the fact that I have abstracted away from any particular theory of QG. From
such an abstract standpoint it is indeed difficult to tell whether imperfect realism is
required, but this is unsurprising. It is only by looking at a specific theory of QG that a
determination about spacetime realism can be made.
The GR/NC case allows me to sidestep this objection. In the GR/NC case we are
dealing with particular theories, and theories that we understand quite well, and still it is
hard to make the case that imperfect realism is forced. This suggests that the problem lies
with our understanding of imperfect realism, rather than our understanding of particular
theories. Filling out the discussion with a specific approach to QG won’t clearly make a
difference. Besides, if it is the case that whether imperfect realism is true can only be
determined by first identifying a specific theory of QG and focusing on that, then it is
difficult to see how we could be in a position to rule out eliminativism anyway. It really
depends on what the correct theory of QG turns out to be, and how similar its ontology
ultimately is to spacetime.
One final point before I move on. Once we have shifted the discussion to focus
on imperfect realism about spacetime, the distinction between realism and eliminativism
seems much less significant. The distinction is, at best, a matter of degree. Realism is
true if what exists is sufficiently close to spacetime; eliminativism is true if what exists
is not sufficiently close. We may find that there are two quite similar approaches to QG
that fall on different sides of the realist/eliminativist divide, depending again on what
exactly it takes for imperfect realism to be true. This, in itself, makes it difficult to see
how eliminativism could be ruled out or even why we would want to. It also makes elim-
inativism seems much less objectionable. In considering the distinction between realism
and eliminativism we are not necessarily considering two radically divergent pictures of
reality. We may, in the end, be considering two quite similar ontologies.
2.4. Empirical Coherence
I come now to the third and final argument against spacetime eliminativism. Whereas
the first and second arguments focus on inter-theoretic relationships between GR and
QG, the third argument focuses directly on QG, and on a specific constraint that has
been proposed for the entire QG program. The constraint is one of empirical coherence.
Following Barrett (1999), a theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory
undermines any prospect for empirically justifying it.
According to Huggett and Wüthrich (2013), approaches to QG in which spacetime is
absent at the fundamental level face a potential threat of empirical incoherence. On one
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way of interpreting this threat, it is possible to formulate an argument against spacetime
eliminativism (whether this is how Huggett and Wüthrich intend for the threat of empirical
incoherence to be formulated is an issue I return to below).
Here’s the idea. In order to empirically confirm a theory, one must gather observations
that provide evidence for the theory in question. Suppose, however, that observation is
linked to spatiotemporal location, in this sense: it is possible to observe an entity only
if that entity is located in a region of spacetime. Now, suppose that, according to some
theory T, spacetime does not exist at all. Then it follows that nothing is located in a
region of spacetime according to that theory because there are no such regions. From
this it follows that there is nothing to be observed. In this situation, T is empirically
incoherent: if the theory is true, then it cannot be empirically justified. Conversely, a
theory is empirically coherent only if, according to that theory, spacetime exists.
Based on this line of reasoning, a third argument against spacetime eliminativism can
be stated as follows:
1. A theory T is empirically coherent only if, according to T, spacetime exists.
2. A theory of QG is viable only if it is empirically coherent.
3. So, a theory of QG is viable only if, according to that theory, spacetime exists.
Assuming that theories of QG are viable and thus empirically coherent, it follows
that spacetime must exist according to those theories. Notice that this third argument
sidesteps any need to provide a full account of imperfect realism. No matter how imper-
fect realism is ultimately spelled out, realism about spacetime must be true if any theory
of QG is to be viable. This third argument does not therefore suffer from the issues
identified with imperfect realism in the previous section.
The argument fails for a different reason. The particular picture of observability
needed to make the argument work is implausible. On this picture, observation can only
occur in the presence of spacetime. But then this would have the bizarre consequence
that any theory that does not imply the existence of spacetime is empirically incoherent,
not just a theory of QG. Given that spacetime appears so late in the history of science, it
would follow that every theory before roughly the 20th century was empirically incoherent,
since those theories did not carry such an implication. But that’s implausible.
It is also doubtful that this is the picture of empirical coherence that Huggett and
Wüthrich endorse.7 For them, observation is a matter of observing local beables. The
notion of a local beable, however, is not tied to spacetime. A local beable, very roughly
is just an entity located in space that can be observed at a particular time (cf. Bell
(1987)). Huggett and Wüthrich argue that for a theory to be empirically coherent, it
must be able to support observations of local beables in this sense. This requirement ties
observation to the existence of entities located in space and time, but not to location in
spacetime. Their concern, then, is that theories of QG that don’t employ spacetime at
the fundamental level also seem to lack any fundamental spatial or temporal structure.
Such theories therefore don’t seem to have the capacity to underwrite observation, but
not, in the end, because spacetime goes missing. Rather, it is because space and time
are placed under threat.
7This was noted by a referee.
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The true threat of empirical coherence thus relies on a conception of observability
that is linked to space and time, not spacetime. Once this is realised, it becomes clear
that there is no straightforward case to be made against spacetime eliminativism based on
the threat in question. Even if it is correct that the approaches to QG that Huggett and
Wüthrich focus on lack space and time at the fundamental level, it does not follow that
a metaphysical commitment to emergent spacetime is required to secure the empirical
coherence of those approaches. In order to secure empirical coherence one needs only an
emergent structure of locations that possess spatial and temporal properties.
Now, it could be argued that, within QG at least, the existence of some physical
structure in which spatial and temporal locations may be defined just is sufficient for the
existence of spacetime.8 The idea being that any emergent physical structure that can
provide spatial and temporal locations for beables (and thus support empirical coherence)
must also have the same observational consequences of spacetime. That’s because any
such emergent structure would be operating at the level of description corresponding to
GR, and so should be empirically indistinguishable from spacetime itself.
This line of thought, however, brings us back to the argument from empirical adequacy
and thus to the issues identified above for imperfect realism. To defend the view that
the existence of something empirically equivalent to spacetime implies realism, one must
provide an account of how close is close enough for realist purposes when it comes to
spacetime. That, I have noted, is something we don’t yet have, and so it remains open
that even if there exists a fundamental structure with emergent spatial and temporal
properties, spacetime does not exist. We should be very careful about moving between
realism regarding space and time and realism regarding spacetime for this reason.
3. An Eliminativist Framework
Thus far I have argued that spacetime eliminativism remains open as a way of interpreting
QG. This result is of limited significance, however, if eliminativism is false or uninteresting.
As discussed in §1, my goal is not to argue that eliminativism is true. I will, however,
argue that the view serves as a potentially useful framework for developing two existing
approaches to the metaphysics of QG. The view is, if nothing else, worth considering.
The first approach to the metaphysics of QG I will consider appeals to mereology.
The second approach appeals to functionalism. Both approaches are typically stated
against a realist backdrop. I will show that reformulating these accounts using spacetime
eliminativism enables one to avoid concerns that have been raised for each view.9
3.1. Mereology
I will start with the mereological approach. Roughly speaking, according to this approach,
QG describes a fundamental ontology of non-spatiotemporal parts which, in various com-
binations, build up the rest of reality. A view along these lines is attractive because of
the role that mereology plays in the rest of science. Mereological relations are often
found ‘connecting the levels’, as it were (such as the macro and micro levels), and so it
is natural to suppose that they connect the more fundamental entities described by QG
8For instance, Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019) take the presence of space and time to justify the
existence of spacetime in a ‘minimal’ sense.
9These views are not necessarily in competition, and may be held together.
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to other, less fundamental entities. For this reason, the mereological approach is rather
elegant. It proposes to analyse all transitions from the more fundamental to the less
fundamental in the same broad metaphysical terms, and thus paints a unified picture of
the structure of physical reality.10
One way to develop a mereological view along these lines involves adopting space-
time realism. On this view, spacetime exists and it is composed of a range of non-
spatiotemporal parts that are described by a theory of QG. We can thereby do justice
to the way in which the fundamental ontology is not spatiotemporal, while nonetheless
making room for the existence of spacetime by linking it to some more fundamental
structure.
Baron (forthcoming) raises an objection against a mereological picture of QG along
these lines. The problem, roughly speaking, is that there are various plausible constraints
on the mereology of physical entities that seem to undermine the idea that spacetime
might be composed of non-spatiotemporal parts. In particular, Baron focuses on the
following four mereological principles:
Inheritance of Location: If x is part of y, then y is located wherever x is
located.
H5: For any x and any y, x is a part of y iff x’s location is a subregion of y’s
location.
Smaller Than: Proper parts are smaller than the wholes they compose,
where for any x and y, x is smaller than y iff there is a region r at which x
is exactly located that is a proper sub-region of the region r∗ at which y is
exactly located.
Compositionality of Extension: For any spatiotemporal object y and for
any x1...xn, if x1...xn compose y, then the spatiotemporal extent of y is a
function of the spatiotemporal extensions of x1...xn and the spatiotemporal
relations between x1...xn.
The inheritance of location is drawn from work by Sider (2007), who maintains that
it is one of the core aspects of parthood that differentiates it from identity. H5, by
contrast, is one of the principles of mereological harmony identified by Saucedo (2011),
which conceptually tie mereology and location together. The smaller-than principle is
similar to a principle discussed by Donnelly (2011), who takes it to be a core feature of
the mereology of physical objects. The compositionality of extension, is so far as I can
tell Baron’s own, but it seems plausible enough.
Baron argues that all four principles are false if spacetime has non-spatiotemporal
parts. This is easy enough to see in a rough sense. Each principle transmits loca-
tion either upward from parts to wholes, or downward from wholes to parts. Suppose,
then, that spacetime exists. If spacetime exists, then so do spacetime regions. Each
spacetime region, on the mereological picture described above, will be composed of non-
spatiotemporal parts, because all of spacetime is. Each spatiotemporal region, however,
occupies a particular location within the spacetemporal manifold.
10The mereological approach is developed by Le Bihan (2018a,b) in the context of QG. See also Ney
(2020) and Paul (2012).
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Each region is itself spatiotemporally located. If each region is spatiotemporally
located and none of its parts are, then it follows that location cannot be transmitted
from part to whole or from whole to part. That is sufficient to undermine each of the
four ‘transmission’ principles stated above.11
Notice, however, that Baron’s argument against this broad mereological picture only
really works if there are wholes that have a spacetime location and those wholes have
parts that lack a spacetime location or vice versa. In short, what is needed to falsify each
of the four principles above is a difference in location between parts and wholes. If parts
and wholes are located in the same way, even if that way is not a spatiotemporal way,
then all four principles can be sustained. Location is free to transmit from parts to wholes
and back again. Baron’s argument can be avoided entirely, then, if we simply give up
on the existence of spacetime, and thus on the notion that anything is spatiotemporally
located. Once this is done, we are free to accept that the more fundamental entities
described by a theory of QG can compose less fundamental entities. This can be done
without sacrificing even a single mereological principle involving location.
Of course, for this to work, we need a viable notion of location in QG such that
parts and wholes can both be located in the same way. It is possible, then, that even
within the eliminativist framework, a version of Baron’s worry can be reformulated. For
as we saw when discussing the threat of empirical incoherence, there seems to be some
pressure to admit the existence of locations with spatial and temporal properties at the
non-fundamental level. As Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) argue, however, space and time
may go missing at the fundamental level in QG. But a transition from parts that are not
spatially or temporally located to wholes that are will undermine the four mereological
principles that Baron identifies once again. Accordingly, the mereological, spacetime
eliminativist picture likely requires the presence of locations with spatial and temporal
properties at both fundamental and non-fundamental levels.
This need not sink the eliminativist proposal, however. For while it is plausible that
spacetime is missing at the fundamental level in QG, it is ultimately less clear that space
and time are lost. Indeed, as Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019) argue, a division between
space and time may persist for a range of approaches to QG. The core of their argument
focuses on Lorentz symmetry. The Lorentz group features an in-built asymmetry which
can be interpreted as a split between two orthogonal vectors, that appear to be broadly
spatial and temporal in nature. The presence of Lorentz symmetries is thus often asso-
ciated with a division between space and time. According to Le Bihan and Linnemann,
many approaches to QG currently available still obey the Lorentz symmetries, and so
implement a division between space and time at the most basic level.
I admit, however, that the existence of fundamental spatial and temporal properties
remains controversial in QG, and note this as a limitation of the mereological, spacetime
eliminativist framework. I also recognise that adopting spacetime eliminativism is not
the only way to address Baron’s worry. One might, for instance, develop a mereology
11If a spacetime region R has parts p1...pn that are not spatiotemporally located, then Inheritance
of Location is false: the pn are all parts of R and yet none are located where R is. H5 is also false: the
pn occupy no spatiotemporal regions and so a fortiori occupy no sub-region of R. Smaller than fails for
much the same reason: some of the pn will be proper parts of R. However, none of the pn are smaller
than R because none of them occupy any sub-region of R. Finally, the spatiotemporal extent of R is not
a function of the spatiotemporal extent of the pn because they are not spatiotemporally extended, and
so Compositionality of Extension is false.
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that does not constrain parthood with principles that enforce the transmission of location
between parts and wholes. Still, it remains an advantage of the eliminativist approach
that—in principle at least—it presents a path toward adopting a mereology that includes
a broad range of mereological principles.
3.2. Functionalism
This brings me to the second broad approach to QG: spacetime functionalism. The basic
idea behind spacetime functionalism is that there are certain functional roles associated
with spacetime, and these roles are filled by the entities described by a theory of QG.
Spacetime functionalism has been proposed by a number of philosophers, and there are
various forms of the view available. My focus, however, is on the specific functionalist
approach advocated by Lam and Wüthrich (2018). Lam and Wüthrich’s version of
spacetime functionalism is modelled closely on functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
This version of functionalism, they maintain, generally involves the following two stages:
(FR-1) The higher-level properties or entities, which are the target of the
reduction, are ‘functionalized’, that is, they are given a functional definition
in terms of their causal or functional role.
(FR-2) An explanation is provided of how the lower-level properties or entities
can fill this functional role. (Lam and Wüthrich, 2018, p. 43)
Applied to the case of spacetime, (FR-1) involves providing a functional specification
for spacetime, or for spatiotemporal properties such that if something stands in the
relations or possesses the properties, then that thing functionally realises spacetime.
Having provided a functional specification for spacetime, the next step is to show that,
for a given approach to QG, there is something in the ontology of the theory that stands
in the relevant relations or possesses the relevant properties. In this way, spacetime may
be functionally realised by a physical structure described by a theory of QG, in much the
same manner that a mental state, like pain, might be realised by the physical structure
described by some neurophysiological theory.
According to Yates (2021), spacetime functionalism faces a dilemma. In what follows,
I will offer a reconstruction of Yates’ argument.12 The reconstructed argument differs
from Yates’ version in some respects, but the basic idea is the same. First, some set-up
is in order. To begin with, it is important to draw an ontological distinction between
fundamental and non-fundamental entities. A non-fundamental entity is an entity that
depends on something for its existence. A fundamental entity, by contrast, is an entity
that does not depend on anything for its existence.
The notion of fundamentality I employ is theory-relative. Thus, an entity x is funda-
mental in my sense when it is fundamental according to a theory T. Which is to say that
by the lights of T, there is nothing that x depends upon for its existence. Similarly, x is
non-fundamental according to a theory T when, according to T, there is something that
x depends on for its existence.
Next, suppose that for some theory of QG, no fundamental entities in the ontology
of that theory have spatiotemporal properties. Rather, what is fundamental according to
12I am grateful to a referee for pressing me to clarify this argument.
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that theory is some non-spatiotemporal entity or entities. Finally, assume that there is
something in the ontology of that theory that plays the spacetime role.
Here, then, is the dilemma: either what plays the spacetime role in the theory of
QG at issue is fundamental or it is non-fundamental. If what plays the spacetime role
is fundamental then it follows that the theory of QG bears an ontological commitment
to spacetime as a fundamental entity. This is true, at least, for the two main forms
of functionalism: realiser functionalism and role functionalism. According to realiser
spacetime functionalism, spacetime is identical to whatever plays the spacetime role.
Thus if that entity is fundamental, then so is spacetime. According to role spacetime
functionalism, by contrast, spacetime is to be identified with a property possessed by
a physical structure, namely that of being in a state that plays the spacetime role. If
some fundamental entity is in such a state—and it should be if it plays the spacetime
role—then that entity has spatiotemporal properties understood in the relevant sense (as
higher-order functional properties).
Since we are assuming that the theory of QG at issue does not include any fundamental
entities with spatiotemporal properties, we have a problem: no fundamental entity can
play the spacetime role. So some non-fundamental entity must be doing this work.
This brings us to the second horn of the dilemma. If what plays the spacetime role is
some non-fundamental entity or entities, then a further question arises. Namely, what
is the relationship between the fundamental non-spatiotemporal entities and the non-
fundamental spatiotemporal entities? To be sure, the relationship is one of dependence.
But the question is how do the spatiotemporal entities at issue depend, for their existence,
on more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal entities? Call this: the dependence question.
In light of this question, there is a stronger and a weaker way to put the second horn
of the dilemma. The stronger way is to maintain that answering the dependence question
is what spacetime functionalism was originally introduced to do. So if some other answer
to that question is needed, then functionalism is otiose. This way of putting the point is
too strong, however. For even if a further answer to the dependence question is needed,
functionalism is still useful. What the functionalist has shown is that there is something
in QG that plays the spacetime role, even if the connection between that entity and the
more fundamental entities within that theory’s ontology must be further explained.
The weaker way of putting the second horn of the dilemma is just to point out that
answering the dependence question is difficult. For it is unclear how non-spatiotemporal
entities might give rise to spatiotemporal ones. To see why this question is difficult, con-
sider the philosophy of mind case. The ontology of a neurophysiological theory contains
individual neurons which are fundamental, and non-fundamental neural states which are
large assemblages of neurons configured in a certain way, and that depend on neurons for
their existence. Now, functionalism about the mind will identify something in the ontol-
ogy of the neurophysiological theory with mental states. Clearly, we don’t want to identify
individual neurons with mental states. So we should assume that it is non-fundamental
neural states that realise mental states.
In the mental state case we also have to explain the relationship between non-
fundamental neural states and individual neurons. But doing so appears straightforward:
we can simply appeal to mereology and say that individual neurons compose the neural
states that realise mental states. A similar move is available for other cases of functional
reduction in science, such as the functional reduction of fluids to groups of molecules.
Here too, we can say that fluids are composed of molecules in certain configurations.
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The trouble in the case of spacetime functionalism and QG is that the mereological op-
tion is not clearly available. This is essentially because of the problem discussed in §3.1.
It is not clear that our standard mereological tools will work to connect spatiotemporal
entities with non-spatiotemporal ones. It is also unclear how else we might answer the
dependence question in this case.
Of course, that the dependence question is difficult does not mean it is intractable.
Still, it would be nice to avoid it. If spacetime eliminativism can be combined with a
functionalist approach to QG, then the dependence question can be avoided. For, clearly,
if spacetime does not exist in any sense, then it can hardly be objected that we lack an
account of how it exists.
At first glance, however, it is difficult to see how one might combine a functionalist
approach to QG with a form of spacetime eliminativism. The trick to combining these
positions is to note that functional realisation can come in degrees. Often a functional
specification of some P will involve the identification of a range of different properties
and relations which, together, fill out the functional role. This is true in the case of pain,
and equally true in the case of spacetime, where the functional specification itself is likely
to have a number of moving parts. A form of spacetime eliminativism can be upheld
then by, first, providing a functional specification for spacetime and, second, maintaining
that the full functional specification is not, in fact, satisfied by any entity in QG. Rather,
the functional specification at issue is satisfied in an attenuated sense only: a number of
the properties or relations associated with the spacetime role are possessed by something
described by a theory of QG, but not enough to establish realism.
Now, it pays to be careful here. Recall the distinction between perfect and imperfect
realism introduced above. The perfect realist maintains that for some P named by a
theory T, P exists exactly as that theory describes it. The imperfect realist, by contrast,
maintains that for some P named by a theory T, P does not exist exactly as that theory
describes it, but it exists well-enough to say that there are Ps. Perfect and imperfect
realism apply in the case of functionalism as well. A perfect realist who endorses a
functional account of P, will maintain that P exists only if the full functional role for P is
satisfied. An imperfect realist, by contrast, will allow for a certain degree of approximation
with respect to the satisfaction of a functional role for P. So long as enough of the
functional specification is realised, we can say that P’s are functionally realised well-
enough, and thus that they exist.
By saying that the functional role for spacetime is partially filled, I am not simply com-
mitting to imperfect realism. The idea, rather, is that while some part of the functional
specification of spacetime is realised, not enough is satisfied to force a commitment to
even imperfect realism. Such a view gains whatever benefits are associated with partially
realising the functional role for spacetime, without the need to adopt a realist attitude
toward spacetime.
As was the case with imperfect realism above, the difference between an imperfect
realist approach to spacetime functionalism and an eliminativist approach is a matter
of degree. As noted, this makes the distinction between spacetime eliminativism and
imperfect realism less impressive than it might otherwise be, and this is no less true in the
functionalist case. In the present context, however, the distinction is substantive enough
to avoid having to answer the dependence question. And so falling on the eliminativist
side of the distinction carries with it a distinct advantage.
What exactly are the benefits associated with partially realising the functional role
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for spacetime? Well, the chief reason Lam and Wüthrich recommend a functionalist
approach to QG in the first place is to provide a solution to the problem of empirical
incoherence. This is just the problem, discussed in §2.4, of explaining how a theory of QG
can be empirically coherent given that space, time and spacetime do not seem to exist
at the fundamental level. As already argued, however, the existence of spacetime is not
necessary for solving this problem. So long as a theory admits of a well-defined notion of
location—one that is linked to observability—the relevant notion of location need not be
spatiotemporal in nature. Translated into a functionalist key, what this means is that the
full functional specification for spacetime need not be satisifed in order for the problem
of empirical incoherence to be met. All one needs to show is that there exists some
physical structure that is capable of realising those functions of spacetime that relate to
location.13
We can put the point in terms of a localising role. One of the functions of space-
time, we may suppose, is to provide locations for entities. A functional specification for
spacetime is thus likely to include this aspect, but is likely to include a good deal more
in order to fully flesh out what it is to be spacetime. From the perspective of solving the
problem of empirical incoherence, however, all we need to do is show how the localising
role of spacetime can be played by something within the ontology of a theory of QG.
Showing that every aspect of the full functional specification for spacetime is filled, or
even most aspects are filled, is surplus to requirements. To solve the problem of empirical
incoherence, we don’t need the functional specification for spacetime to be satisfied up
to the point where imperfect realism is then true.
Note that the view I am proposing is compatible with much of what Lam and Wüthrich
say. When setting out their functionalist approach, they note that “spacetime need not
be fully recovered in some strong ontological sense ... in order to provide the grounds for
empirical evidence ... but only certain functionally relevant features” (Lam and Wüthrich,
2018, p. 40) which seems broadly in line with the view I am proposing. They also
focus on the localising role of spacetime in much the way I have suggested when they
demonstrate their functional analysis. Indeed, they suggest that a non-spatiotemporal
notion of location may be present at the level of GR already, noting that “localization
... may primarily be understood as relational and dynamical rather than fundamentally
spatiotemporal.” (Lam and Wüthrich, 2018, p. 47).14 That being said, in more recent
work Lam and Wüthrich (2020) appear to defend spacetime realism, maintaining that
spacetime functionalism understood in a realist sense provides a way to connect QG to
“a straightforwardly realist understanding of GR”. As they recognise, this places them in
danger of falling on Yates’ dilemma, a problem that functionalism, if interpreted in an
eliminativist spirit, can avoid.
4. Conclusion
I have not argued that spacetime eliminativism is true. Not for QG in general, nor
for any particular approach to QG. In fact, I suspect that establishing eliminativism is
13This may require showing how spatial and temporal properties can be realised. Functionalist space-
time eliminativism may therefore be limited in so far as it requires the existence of fundamental spatial
and temporal properties (on pain of facing a new dependence question about how spatial and temporal
entities arise from non-spatial, non-temporal ones).
14This was pointed out by a referee.
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about as difficult as establishing imperfect realism. In order to know whether a realist or
eliminativist attitude is warranted, we must first limn the boundaries of realism. A better
understanding of imperfect realism should thus be high on the agenda for everyone. Still,
as I have argued here, spacetime eliminativism is at least a possible way of interpreting
QG, and doing so yields certain benefits when it comes to two specific metaphysical
approaches that one might take. We should thus take seriously the idea that spacetime
may not survive the unification of GR and the standard model, not fundamentally, and
perhaps not at all.
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Wüthrich, Christian (2017), “Raiders of the lost spacetime.” In Towards a Theory of
Spacetime Theories (D. Lehmkuhl, G. Schiemann, and E. Scholz, eds.), 297–335,
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